Plugging into the Body of the Leviathan: Proposal for a New Sociology of Public Interventions by Eyal, Gil
The main argument of this short essay is 
that the concept of intellectual, especially 
the somewhat redundant neologism of 
public intellectual, is too narrow to guide 
research on how interventions in public 
affairs are currently authored, crafted, and 
operated. Instead, I propose the concept 
of public interventions to inform a more 
comprehensive approach that broadens 
the analytical frame by multiplying rel-
evant agencies, modes and targets of in-
tervention. This approach is inspired by 
Foucault’s (Truth and Power) distinction 
between the “universal” and “specific” 
intellectual; Bourdieu’s (Corporatism) re-
placement of the latter by a “collective in-
tellectual”; and the approach to the public 
sphere urged by the contributors to Mak-
ing Things Public (Latour and Weibel).
I will begin by sketching a brief and sche-
matic genealogy of the concepts of “in-
tellectuals” and “public intellectual,” to 
explain why they are at once too freighted 
with historical meaning (and a narrative of 
decline), as well as analytically too narrow, 
for dealing with the realities of contempo-
rary interventions in the public sphere. I 
will then proceed to outline an alternative 
approach focused on interventions, along 
the three dimensions of agencies, modes 
and targets.
Why Are Intellectuals Always Disappearing 
and Reappearing, Declining and Resurging, 
Defending Their Mission or Betraying It?  
The idea of the “intellectual” has a long 
and ambiguous pedigree. As Charle puts 
it, it is “essentially historical,” a category 
of historical memory. It is not a concept 
that can be picked up ready-made and be 
used for analytical purposes. It could, of 
course, be used for practical and strategic 
purposes, but then one should be aware 
of the long history of uses and abuses it 
trails behind it, and the set of mechanisms 
and assumptions that gets activated every 
time it is deployed.
These are mechanisms of defamation and 
celebration, of self-definition and coun-
ter-definition—in short, of boundary work 
(Gieryn) and classificatory struggle (Bour-
dieu, Intellectual Field). It is instructive to 
know that the term intellectuel was first 
coined during the Dreyfus affair—not for 
analytical or diagnostic purposes, but as 
a political insult. “To be ‘intellectuel’ meant 
to be ‘dreyfusard,’ that is a person who pre-
tends to uphold things that the majority 
of the French refuse” (Charle). The insult, 
however, was embraced by its addressees 
and turned into a mobilizing device, a ral-
lying call designed to bring into being and 
demarcate the boundaries of the category 
thus named (Bauman 2-8). Those who is-
sued the call—Zola, Clemenceau, Anatol 
France, Henri Poincare, Durkheim—con-
sidered themselves to be the best repre-
sentatives of the category and addressed 
their call to the like-minded. The lauda-
tory meaning they gave it is still worn as a 
badge of honor today, just as the original 
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mocking meaning could still be activated 
as well. 
The later career of the concept involved 
a continuous tangle between those who 
wanted to adapt it to changing historical 
circumstances, give it objective analytical 
meaning and extend it to wider circles 
of the educated, and those, on the other 
hand, who sought to redraw the boundary 
between who is and who is not a “true” 
intellectual based on the tradition, the 
preserved historical memory of the intel-
lectuels. This boundary work often took the 
form of accusations that the intellectuals 
had betrayed their “true” mission (Benda, 
Treason), and ultimately informed a prob-
lematic of allegiance that pervaded all the 
later attempts to give the concept an ob-
jective analytical meaning (Eyal and Buch-
holz; see also Charle).
Only when taking into account this history 
of the concept can one understand the cur-
rent popularity enjoyed by the concept of 
public intellectual. The conjunction “public 
intellectual” is, fi rst of all, very recent. As 
can be seen in Figure 1, it hardly existed 
before 1987. The little uptick in 1987 marks 
the publication of Russell Jacoby’s The 
Last Intellectuals, a book that bemoaned 
the disappearance of intellectuals while at 
the same time creating something com-
pletely new, namely the conjunction “pub-
lic intellectual.” As can be seen in Figure 1, 
from the moment Jacoby announced their 
disappearance, the chatter about public 
intellectuals took off and never shut up.1
Second, the conjunction “public intellec-
tual” is also very peculiar. It is strikingly 
redundant. Intellectuals were always un-
derstood—and understand themselves—
as those who in their writing and speak-
ing appeal to a broad public. So we have 
a small mystery here: How is it that the 
addition of a redundant qualifi er works 
to resuscitate and energize a moribund 
concept pronounced to be on the vein? 
X+0=X2? What exactly is done by add-
ing the qualifi er “public”? The answer is 
boundary work. The addition of “public” 
redraws the boundary between who is, 
and who is not, a “true” intellectual in a 
very specifi c way, excluding from the ca-
tegory of academics and especially ex-
perts who are understood to be confi ned 
to narrow technical pursuits. 
By the late 1970s, there were many at-
tempts to give “intellectuals” objective 
analytical meaning as a “new class” com-
posed of experts, technocrats, profession-
als, and academics (Bruce-Briggs 1979; 
Gouldner 1979; Konrad and Szelenyi 1979; 
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Figure 1: Frequency of appearance of “public intellectual” in Google Books from 1980 to 2000
Source: Graph. Google Books. Google, 18 June 2012. Web. 18 June 2012.
















Walker 1979). Adding the qualifier “public,” 
therefore, was boundary work meant to 
exclude experts and academics from the 
category and to signal that true intellectu-
als are not experts and academics: They 
are not entangled in mundane technical 
affairs or limited to their ivory tower. They 
address a broad public, owing allegiance 
only to truth and universal values. Since 
this conjunction first appeared in a book 
titled The Last Intellectuals, a book that 
belonged to the venerable genre of jer-
emiad (mixture of lament and accusation) 
about the decline of true intellectuals and 
betrayal of their original mission (Posner), 
it activated not only boundary work from 
experts, but also an entire narrative—de-
riving from the historical memory of the 
intellectuels—about decline, “endangered 
species,” the threat of betrayal (by turn-
ing expert) or extinction (by a society of 
expertise), and consequently provoked a 
debate about whether public intellectuals 
are disappearing or on the contrary, reap-
pearing on the web and the blogosphere 
(Donatich; Fuller; Kellner).
From Intellectuals to Interventions
The concept of public intellectual, there-
fore, leads us into a blind alley where noth-
ing but echoes of the historical memory of 
the intellectuels reverberate between the 
walls. We need to retrace our steps back to 
an intersection where this boundary work 
between intellectuals and experts was 
questioned, and pick an alternative path 
from there. Fortunately, this intersection 
is not too far behind. It is represented by 
Foucault’s (Truth and Power 128) distinc-
tion between the universal and specific 
intellectual.2 While the “universal” intel-
lectual fits the mold of what is meant by 
“public intellectual”—the prototype is re-
presented by the engaged man of letters 
(e.g. Zola, Sartre) who speaks in the name 
of truth and universal values—the “specific” 
intellectual is an expert. 
Foucault’s example of a “specific intel-
lectual” is Robert Oppenheimer. Oppen-
heimer, says Foucault, was an individual 
whose narrow technical work as an ex-
pert acquired universal dimensions when 
it threatened the whole human species 
with extinction, and who consequently 
felt compelled to intervene in public af-
fairs. Oppenheimer did not begin as the 
independent, engaged critic that he came 
to embody later. He started as an expert 
working in the service of the American 
government, first at the Manhattan proj-
ect, and then as Chairman of the General 
Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC). It was from this posi-
tion that he began lobbying for interna-
tional arms control, i.e. that he began in-
tervening in public affairs. Eventually, his 
activism led to the revocation of his secu-
rity clearance in 1954 during the heyday of 
McCarthyism, and he became a bona fide 
dissident intellectual. Foucault concludes, 
therefore, that there is no reason to draw 
a strong distinction between intellectu-
als and experts: “the intellectual is simply 
the person who uses his knowledge, his 
competence and his relation to truth in 
the field of political struggles” (Truth and 
Power 128). Put differently, what is common 
to all who may be termed “specific intel-
lectuals” is not that they correspond to a 
specific social type (since experts come 
in many different forms and shapes), but 
rather the movement by which their local 
and technical knowledge acquires a more 
general and public value and becomes the 
basis for intervention in public affairs. What 
is interesting about Oppenheimer surely 
is not merely his end point as a dissident 
intellectual, but the movement which took 
him from technical concerns and govern-
ment service to increasingly independent 
intervention in public affairs. A movement, 
it is important to note, that did not owe its 
momentum solely to Oppenheimer him-
self, thus leading us away from the myth 
of the public intellectual as author and first 
mover. What Foucault did, therefore, was 
not to add another type, but to draw ana-
lytical attention to the enduring element in 
the concept of “intellectual,” the part that 
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is indifferent to boundary work and clas-
sificatory struggles, and that could serve 
as a basis for reconstructing the concept.
Agencies of Intervention
The analytical framework I propose here 
is designed to analyze a movement, not 
a social type or a group. The first ques-
tion, however, is “who is moving?” When 
analysis is focused on “public intellectu-
als,” it tends to privilege the actions and 
pronouncements of a few prominent fig-
ures, thereby inevitably leading to bound-
ary work, hagiography or a narrative of 
decline and betrayal. When, on the other 
hand, we analyze the movement by which 
knowledge acquires value as intervention 
in public affairs, the frame is broadened 
considerably. 
First, it is clear that often this movement 
is initiated or carried through by experts, 
Foucault’s “specific intellectuals,” rather 
than generalist intellectuals. Moreover, 
these experts need not be only glamorous 
and well-known individuals, such as Op-
penheimer, but can come from the ranks 
of the more “gray” practitioners, who often 
work away from the spotlight enjoyed by 
prominent figures. Yet, arguably, the pub-
lic impact of their work is often no less 
profound. Few would recognize the names 
of the economists who designed the in-
dicator of aggregate productivity trends. 
The number-cruncher bent over reams of 
data seems far away from the image of the 
engaged or celebrity intellectual—though 
Nate Silver, the recently crowned “public 
statistician” (Scheiber), may still upend this 
stereotype. Yet, as Block and Burns show, 
these obscure economists profoundly 
shaped public discussion and political 
struggle over labor issues in the US over 
several crucial decades.
Or put differently, to avoid taking sides in 
boundary wars, we should take into ac-
count all actors making credible claims 
to represent publicly relevant knowledge 
and to engage with public affairs. And we 
need to take them into account not in iso-
lation, or serially, but rather relationally as 
interdependent and competing in a com-
mon “intellectual field” where who is an 
intellectual and how to legitimately inter-
vene in public affairs are objects of clas-
sificatory struggles (Bourdieu, Intellectual 
Field). Rather than limiting the analysis to 
a specific social type, this type of relation-
al analysis directs attention to the factors 
structuring the intellectual field—the dis-
tribution of symbolic capital, the degree 
of independence from external political 
demand, and the degree of specializa-
tion (Sapiro). Field analysis replaces social 
types with intersections of these factors. 
For example, a region with a high degree 
of symbolic capital, relative immunity to 
political demand, but weak specializa-
tion (a region roughly corresponding to 
where internationally acclaimed literary 
figures may be found), is likely to corre-
late with a mode of intervention in public 
affairs that approximates the ideal typi-
cal “public intellectual” (ibid.). Yet, field 
analysis also attends to the independent 
effect of trajectory and the construction 
of specific agencies of intervention. Inter-
sections of factors specify positions, so to 
speak, but these positions could be occu-
pied by a certain (albeit limited in char-
acteristic ways) range of different actors, 
embarked on different trajectories, each 
thus subtly modifying the meaning of the 
position, constructing a somewhat differ-
ent agency of intervention (e.g., Richard 
Dawkins moving into the “public intel-
lectual” region entails the construction 
of a different agency of intervention than 
Naomi Klein). By this concept of “agency 
of intervention” I mean to emphasize that 
the answer to “who is moving?” should not 
be conflated with this or that concrete in-
dividual (or social type) because, as noted 
above regarding Oppenheimer, the mo-
mentum of their movement is often not of 
their own doing, and because the traveler, 
so to speak, is modified by the travel, by 
the distance traversed and the obstacles 
encountered, while their movement also 
modifies the region in which they travel in 
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characteristic ways. If repeated and stabi-
lized, this interplay between how the actor 
is catapulted towards intervention, adapts 
herself to the road, yet also causes adapta-
tions all around her path, is what I call an 
“agency of intervention.”
The need to distinguish between concrete 
individuals and agencies of intervention 
is the clearest when it comes to collective 
agencies of intervention. The concept of 
intellectual field permits us to analyze also 
groups, collectives, networks, even orga-
nizations, as participating in the struggle 
over how to legitimately intervene in pub-
lic affairs. This was Bourdieu’s (Corporat-
ism) criticism of Foucault. In contemporary 
conditions, he said, the agency of public 
intervention is most often a “collective 
intellectual”: a group of experts working 
together. The same message comes from 
literature on “epistemic communities” 
(Haas). The propensity to craft a collec-
tive agency of intervention may also be 
correlated with the region of the intellec-
tual field one occupies. Sapiro argues that 
“collective intellectuals” abound where the 
degree of specialization is high while sym-
bolic capital is low. I am not persuaded that 
these are necessary conditions, but this is 
certainly suggestive as a starting point for 
analysis.3
To summarize this first point: once inquiry 
focuses on the construction of agencies of 
intervention, rather than on a social type, 
the scope of relevant actors is broadened 
from a few prominent individuals to in-
clude the ranks of more “gray” practitio-
ners, especially as they increasingly are 
to be found working together in collec-
tives—whether located in one strategic 
site, a public advocacy non-profit, or a 
(God forbid!) think tank (more about think 
tanks a little bit later)—or they are distrib-
uted in far-flung networks and epistemic 
communities. 
Modes of Intervention
The analytical framework proposed here 
begun by asking “who is moving?” and 
developed the concept of “agencies of in-
tervention.” The second step is to ask, how 
do they intervene in public affairs, what are 
the modes of intervention characteristic of 
different agencies? Here, once again, the 
term “intellectuals” or “public intellectual” 
narrows our vision and forestalls a broader 
investigation. When the term “intellectu-
als” was first invented, it was in response 
to a protest letter published in the daily 
newspaper. The letter was collectively 
drafted and signed by several prominent 
academics, men of letters, artists and 
journalists, who demanded a new trial for 
Captain Dreyfus (Charle). From then on, 
when the term “intellectuals” was used, 
it conjured not only a specific social type 
who intervened in public affairs, but also 
the specific mode, media, and manner of 
such intervention. Put differently, one of 
the reasons why the term “public intel-
lectual” functions as boundary work from 
experts is because it references a restrict-
ed set of means (as well as a “style”) by 
which intervention in public affairs could 
take place: the manifesto, the signed peti-
tion or protest letter, the polemical op-ed 
piece (and now the blog), the samizdat 
text, the gesture of “revelation,” prophesy-
ing, “speaking truth to power,” as well as 
propounding “transformative ideas” (Bell; 
Gouldner, Telos; Bauman; Sapiro).
As is evident in this short list of means of in-
tervention, there is an intimate link between 
intellectuals and the concept of opinion. 
Intellectuals, in the classical sense of the 
term—and as discourse about “public intel-
lectuals” seeks to re-inscribe—intervene by 
making their opinion known and by seek-
ing to influence the opinions of others, or 
“public opinion.” This is part of the bound-
ary work that aims to distinguish intellec-
tuals from experts. Opinion, as its etymol-
ogy indicates, is distinct from knowledge 
and expertise in three ways: firstly, it is a 
belief or a conjecture without much sup-
port—the only support it has is in “the force 
of the better argument,” namely rhetoric. 
Secondly, opinion indicates a preference, 
the choice to believe one thing and not 
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another—or, said more flatteringly, “taking 
a position.” Finally, opinion is couched in 
terms that are immediately accessible to 
laypeople. Opinion clarifies, while exper-
tise obfuscates. Opinion clarifies not only 
by being accessible, but also because it is 
rhetorical and one-sided. Out of the clash 
of opinions, clarity emerges. As John Mil-
ton said in Areopagitica, his 1644 polemi-
cal tract against censorship and in defense 
of free speech: “Opinion in good men is 
but knowledge in the making.”
Yet this boundary work between intel-
lectuals who make their opinions public 
and experts who provide technical assess-
ments, between polemics and controver-
sies (Chateauraynaud and Torny), is un-
tenable (see also Heredia, unpublished). 
In contemporary conditions, when techni-
cal matters of concern are at the core of 
political struggles (global warming, eco-
nomic restructuring, genetically modified 
foods—the list could be multiplied indefi-
nitely), there is an irreducibly technical di-
mension to public polemics, just as there 
is an irreducibly rhetorical dimension to 
technical controversies (Latour, Science in 
Action; Latour and Weibel). Consequently, 
opinion strikes me as much too restricted 
a way to conceptualize what it means to 
intervene in public affairs, especially if we 
take into account the interventions made 
by experts and collectives of practitioners. 
The focus on opinion seems calculated 
to exclude precisely technical expertise 
and a capacity to produce significant po-
litical effects, because it mobilizes robust 
and lasting “truth effects” in the form of 
reports, technical documents, expert tes-
timony, even an experimental demonstra-
tion (properly publicized); or in the format 
of numbers, figures, graphs, and formulas, 
i.e. a “politics of measurement” conducted 
by modifying how matters of public con-
cern are quantified, measured and repre-
sented (Porter; Breslau 39-40; Alonso and 
Star; Block and Burns).
Instead of the restricted means of interven-
tion indexed by opinion, analysis should 
utilize a broad repertoire of formats or 
modes of intervention, all of which in-
volve some hybridization of opinion and 
the technical armature of expertise. This 
hybridization is quite obvious in a series 
of technical products that are submitted 
to some kind of an adversarial procedure 
or forum: expert testimony at court; “posi-
tion papers,” that quintessential product 
of think tanks; and the “expert opinion” 
elicited by regulatory agencies. In all 
these cases, the adversarial procedure 
or forum does the work of analysis for us, 
so to speak, since it operates to expose 
the irreducible rhetorical dimension of 
technical knowledge, and thus its nature 
as a form of public intervention. These ex-
amples, however, should merely serve to 
remind us that often the most efficacious 
interventions either come black-boxed as 
charts, figures, numbers, and other techni-
cal devices, or they are counter-strategies 
that aim to open up these black boxes and 
make the technical public and political, 
and therefore must be armed with similar 
technical tools. 
A good example is the design of eco-
nomic indicators. When think tanks like 
Redefining Progress or New Economics 
Foundation design and calculate alter-
natives to the gross domestic product 
(GDP) such as, respectively, the “Genuine 
Progress Indicator” (GPI) and the “Happy 
Planet Index” (HPI), this involves opening 
up the black box of the GDP, a techni-
cally detailed critique of how the GDP is 
compiled and measured, and a no less 
spirited and “opinionated” critique of the 
assumptions and presuppositions (read: 
“opinions”) upon which it is based (Eyal 
and Levy). Moreover, to the extent that 
these alternative indicators are employed 
by international, governmental, and non-
governmental organizations to assess 
policy, or even to completely revise the 
System of National Accounts (SNA) (see 
Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi), they constitute 
a formidable intervention in public affairs. 
This is but one example of what I mean 
by suggesting that the analysis of public 
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interventions should incorporate a much 
broader repertoire of formats or modes of 
intervention.
Targets of Intervention
The final question to be asked is where 
intervention takes place. The concept of 
“intellectuals” carries with it a certain nor-
mative (Habermasian) vision of its target 
as the “public sphere,” by which is typi-
cally understood a sphere of public opin-
ion, an agora populated by reasonable 
citizens who are presented with conflicting 
opinions and are capable of adjudicating 
between them according to the force of 
the better argument. I argued above that 
the concept of opinion is too narrow to 
capture the broad repertoire of contem-
porary modes of intervention in public af-
fairs. Similar considerations apply when it 
comes to characterizing the target of pub-
lic intervention. Modern-day politics, the 
public affairs wherein intervention should 
take place, are increasingly about techni-
cal affairs regarding which “the public”—
understood as laypeople, who read news-
papers and possess similar capacities for 
critical reasoning—is ignorant. This is an 
inescapable fact, but different conclusions 
could be drawn from it.
One could react defensively and, with 
Habermas, suspect that when the con-
versation gets technical somebody is ob-
fuscating, evading the debate, and using 
scientific jargon and technical details as 
ideology. One would, therefore, seek to 
create mechanisms that filter technical 
discourse and return the public sphere 
to an ideal state of pure conversation of 
opinions.
Or, concurring in diagnosis but diverging 
in valuation, one could affirm that indeed, 
because of the increasing technical com-
plexity of public administration, the public 
is a “phantom”—it is ignorant about these 
matters, which are known only to experts. 
Yet the public’s ignorance could also be 
a strength because this means that it is 
impartial (Lippmann, Public Opinion; The 
Phantom Public; Binkley; Marres; Callon). 
One could reconstitute the public sphere 
through mediation of knowledgeable ob-
servers who act as honest brokers to guide 
the public through expert controversies. 
No doubt Walter Lippman had himself in 
mind. From 1931 to 1967 he wrote a syndi-
cated column to this effect entitled Today 
and Tomorrow, carried by more than 200 
newspapers and reaching an audience of 
more than ten million (Goodwin).
Lippman would probably have disappro-
ved of the way this vision of mediated (and 
mediatized) public sphere has become a 
reality, yet the affinities between his analy-
sis and contemporary realities are undeni-
able. The main reason why the concept of 
“public intellectual” often comes coupled 
with a narrative of decline and betrayal, 
especially in the US, is because the task of 
guiding, mediating, influencing, orchest-
rating, and even creating public opinion 
has become the business of think tanks, 
and they are much better at it than intel-
lectuals, even syndicated ones. It is not a 
coincidence that the concept of “public in-
tellectual” was coined in the mid-1980s, a 
time marked by the ascendency of second- 
generation think tanks in the American po-
lity, which have professionalized the work 
of producing opinions and of producing 
individuals who present an opinionated 
posture as a way of living—pundits, colum-
nists, commentators, “talking heads”4—as 
well as the work of orchestrating and ge-
nerating “public opinion” using modern 
public relations techniques. Collectively, 
these organizations crowd out, speak over, 
or buffer the interventions of independent 
intellectuals (Medvetz).
So if you want to influence public opinion, 
form a think tank! It is possible, however, 
to draw a different conclusion from the in-
creasingly technical nature of matters of 
public concern. My contention, inspired by 
the contributors to Making Things Public 
(Latour and Weibel), is that the concept of 
“the public sphere” is misleading in several 
respects when it comes to characterizing 
the targets of public intervention, and that 
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we need to conceptualize these differently.
First, the concept of “public sphere” sug-
gests a semi-permanent arena where ro-
bust conversation goes on uninterrupted 
among an already constituted social com-
munity. This is why contributions in this vein 
often bemoan the public’s indifference and 
passivity. The arena—if it exists—is already 
occupied by think tanks and mediatized 
discussion, where “the public” does not 
exist prior to being affected and mobilized 
by a specific matter of concern. As Mar-
res suggests, following Dewey, we should 
think of “publics” in the plural as provisi-
onal communities formed in response to 
issues of concern that existing institutions 
and procedures are unable to handle. It 
follows that we should not think of the pu-
blic sphere as a pre-existing arena, a wide 
agora one need only step into to be eleva-
ted into public existence. We should think 
about it as something that flickers in and 
out of existence, depending on whether 
“issues spark publics into being” (Marres 
213), and perhaps—if we need to stick with 
spatial metaphors—as a set of tunnels that 
are often exceedingly narrow and that are 
always in the process of gumming up if 
they are not used. In short, in true Kantian 
fashion, we should never think of the pub-
lic sphere as a given, but always a task (with 
the implication that as historical conditions 
change, so does the task; you cannot hope 
to excavate today’s public sphere with the 
tools of yesteryear). 
The second point has already been made, 
but it bears repeating. Concerning tech-
nical matters of public concern, interven-
tion cannot be efficacious without being 
equipped with the armor of expertise, na-
mely: techniques, instruments, demonst-
rations, figures, charts, numbers. Hence it 
cannot be a public sphere of merely opi-
nion.5 I would argue, moreover, that we 
have much less to fear about the percei-
ved imbalance between experts and lay-
people, which so worried Habermas and 
which led Lippman to declare the public a 
“phantom.” To begin with, regarding new-
ly emerging technical matters of public 
concern, it is often the case that nobody 
is an expert and everybody is ignorant. In-
tervention in public affairs then becomes 
partly a matter of creating or assembling 
expertise where none existed before. This 
is done by collectives composed of lay-
people, activists, and experts, who edu-
cate themselves about a technical matter 
of public concern, and equip themselves 
with the knowledge and the technical 
means to craft an intervention (Callon). 
These collectives not only proliferate today 
in the sphere of patient activism (Epstein; Ra-
beharisoa and Callon; Eyal et al.), but they 
are also predominant in environmental po-
litics or the field of “green economics.”
Finally, the concept of “public sphere” is 
typically contrasted with “the state.” The 
public sphere of free discussion and opin-
ion formation begins where the state—with 
its chains of command and obedience, its 
use of technical discourse as ideology—
ends. We have to get rid of this bound-
ary work as well. I suggest we think of the 
public sphere, or spheres, not as outside 
the state, but within its boundary, within 
fuzzy and thick interfaces where expertise 
and the state interpenetrate and blend 
into each other (Mitchell; Rose). This is no 
doubt why Dewey says that the formation 
of a public involves “the discovery of the 
state” (Marres 213), namely, what is it? What 
should it do? What should/could it be? 
Perhaps the most important question re-
garding the crafting of public intervention 
today is precisely about this “discovery of 
the state” in an era of globalization. Techni-
cal matters of public concern involve not 
just one state, but many, and often all, so 
that the assembly of a public is tantamount 
to the discovery of possibilities for truly 
global governance and coordination. 
These interfaces between expertise and 
the state constitute multiple public spheres 
of sorts, i.e. targets of public intervention 
that are directly continuous with the work 
of experts, because there are already es-
tablished ports into the leviathan, so to 
speak; there are already institutionalized 
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conduits by means of which particular 
types of expertise are permanently con-
nected to the state. A good example is the 
aforementioned SNA. It is definitely part of 
the state since it is compiled on the basis 
of data collected by administrative agen-
cies of the state (the Department of Com-
merce in the US), yet it is also an integral 
part of economic expertise, which not only 
supplies the tools with which to analyze 
these data, but also uses the “accounts” as 
measures of the variables composing gen-
eral equilibrium models. Indeed, the SNA 
could also be seen as an “articulated macro 
level statistical response to the operation-
al demands of a Keynesian economics” 
(Ward 10). Through the SNA, the state has 
been “governmentalized” (Foucault, Gov-
ernmentality) and economic expertise has 
come to occupy a permanent role in the 
government of the economy. Only on the 
basis of this permanent port or interface—
within its volume, as it were—could the con-
struction of alternative economic indica-
tors become a form of public intervention, 
indeed precisely a form of “discovery of 
the state.” Another such permanent port 
is the General Advisory Committee to the 
AEC that Oppenheimer led before he was 
removed. It is an institutionalized interface 
where the expertise of nuclear physicists 
blends with and interpenetrates strategic, 
political, and economic considerations 
of state agencies and decision-makers. 
If we focus on Oppenheimer’s dissident 
years, we would perhaps miss the more 
important and enduring fact that nuclear 
physicists (like economists) routinely inter-
vene in public affairs not from “outside” 
the state, but from within its boundary, as 
an extension of their work as advisers for 
the AEC.
Thus, to intervene in public affairs means 
to travel along “the frail conduits through 
which truths and proofs are allowed to 
enter the sphere of politics” (Latour, Real-
politik 19), to re-open these tunnels where 
they have gotten gummed up, and to plug 
into the body of the leviathan by means of 
these pre-existing ports. To do so, it is im-
possible—as an institutionalized matter of 
course—to rely on opinion alone, rather one 
must come equipped with charts, statistics, 
experiments, and calculations. Ultimately, 
the new face of public intervention in the 
twenty-first century will belong to collec-
tives of experts, laypeople, and activists, 
equipped with technical tools, who forge 
new types of expertise and plug into pre-
existing ports in the body of the leviathan.
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Notes
1   For the sake of comparison, 
the term “intellectuals” without 
qualifiers entered English 
language discussions during 
the first decade of the 
twentieth century (following 
the Dreyfus affair), enjoyed a 
steady climb, and peaked 
around 1970. Discussions of 
“intellectuals” then declined up 
till 1985, when they picked up 
again and returned to 1970 
levels around 1995, no doubt 
due to the coining of the term 
“public intellectual.” 
A similar search on JSTOR 
found that the conjunction 
“public intellectual” appeared 
in the title of 67 articles, the 
first of which is from 1988 and 
is a review of Jacoby’s book. 
It had never been used in the 
title of an article before. 
2  Of course, “new class” 
theories also questioned the 
boundary work between 
experts and intellectuals, but 
they did so by totalizing and 
effacing the distinction 
between the two (relying 
implicitly or explicitly on 
another essentially historical 
concept, namely the Russian 
“intelligentsia” [Malia]), and 
without engaging in the work 
of reconstruction necessary 
to identify the enduring 
element in the concept of 
“intellectuals” and convert it 
into present-day research 
problems and strategies. For 
this work, Foucault offers a 
much better starting point 
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3  In another paper, my co-
author and I have suggested 
to consider the activity of de-
signing and compiling eco-
nomic indicators as a form of 
public intervention (Eyal and 
Levy). I will have more to say 
about this shortly, but for the 
moment let me just note that 
the individuals who joined to-
gether to develop the Human 
Development Index (HDI) 
as an alternative to the GDP 
were by no means low on 
symbolic capital. The group 
was led by a former Pakista-
ni government minister of 
high stature, and included 
Nobel laureate Amartya Sen. 
It seems that in this case the 
mode of intervention—com-
piling an aggregate index—as 
well as the public sphere it 
targeted, the international 
system of national accounts 
(SNA), were more important 
determinants of the type of 
agency constructed than the 
factors identified by Sapiro. 
4  In a play on the old 
Weberian distinction, we 
could say that intellectuals 
live for opinion, while pundits 
(and think tanks) live of 
opinion.
5  This observation is closely 
related to Posner’s argument 
that the production and 
circulation of public 
intellectual commentary 
suffers from a “market failure” 
due to low barriers to entry 
and poor quality control that 
is unable to encourage 
market exit (Posner 72).
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